Tuesday, 3 September 2013

Reject Shop - Is the market pricing in expansion risk.

The Reject Shop (TRS)                                                            3 Sep 2013

Rationale:

TRS offers one of the most exciting long investment prospects in the Australian listed equity market today. Effectively we have a business which is half way through its proposed business growth cycle (currently c.290 stores in operation with a plan to expand to c.400+ stores) currently undergoing accelerated growth due to a market opportunity (i.e. the failure of competitor Retail Adventures). The success of the current expansion will not be clear until c. FY15 so this investment is an assessment of:

  • TRS’s historic ability to return on and profitably run existing businesses;
  •  TRS’s historic ability to roll out stores and ensure they become profitable over a reasonable period of time; and
  • Our expectation of the market conditions surrounding the competitive discount retail space where TRS’s business plays
The current security price at c.$17 prices the success of the expansion at historic margins and dividend payout at an equity return of c. 8% (pre-tax)  - see valuation section. Thus there is a real risk that if the discount retail market deteriorates over the next 2-3 years, TRS’s security will be re-rated downwards.

The risk around this investment is limited to achieving clarity on the performance of TRS over the first half of the financial year (evidently this is due to the seasonality of the returns of the business. Given that the first quarter of FY14 has already passed we should be able to achieve a fair understanding of how the final phase of the accelerated growth strategy is performing. A correct forecasting of the FY14 expansion performance should result in partial re-rating of TRS following the FY14 half yearly results.

Longer term, we need to attempt to understand whether the c.320 store business model is sustainable in the competitive retail sector TRS is a participant of. A large component of this will be management’s ability to select appropriate sites (particularly so as not to cannibalise other store performance), run stores profitably and achieve economies of scale through the larger business model. Based on the historic ability of management to run the TRS business it seems that they have been able to achieve strong ROE and run stores profitably, particularly through the challenging trading conditions of the most recent 5 years. Thus based on management’s proven ability to profitably grow TRS, I would establish that this is a positive increasing the probability of success of the larger business model with the unknown being the behaviour of differing markets where new stores are being opened (although to the extent the company can provide historic trading data, say from Retail Adventures, or the extent to which we can examine the new sites and assess the local market dynamics of each store (maybe by going on a site visit?), a better understanding can be established and this risk reduced).

Key Metrics:





Traded Performance
12 Month Security Price and Volume





Valuation and Historic Performance
The following historic financial data has been extracted from TRS’s annual reports and results presentations. The data evidences the strong seasonality of TRS cashflows, with most income being derived during H1 of each financial year. Further we note that TRS maintains a conservative capital structure, paying down debt when feasible. It is difficult to extract the pure performance of underlying stores as TRS continued to increase stores over the period analysed, however, the effect of more aggressive store number growth is evident from the FY13 results with lower NPAT and operating cashflows.
The TRS Board policy to pay out approximately 50% of Annual NPAT in dividends to shareholders does not quite hold true according to the calculations performed over the period analysed, however it seems to be an appropriate amount to distribute in order to allow the business to operate efficiently given the lack of cash trapped in the business at the end of each annual period.





A high level valuation calculation was performed adopting similar assumptions to those observed over the historic period from 2008 to 2013. It has identified that on a conservative base case the market is approximately pricing an equity return of c. 8%p.a. at the current share price.
  



Market Opinions (Restricted to available research)
Wilson HTM
Date: 22 Aug 2013
Position: Hold
12 Month Target: $18.68
Notes:

  • Business is attractive in light of store-roll outs and benefits from industry consolidation
  • In near term execution risk around the high volume of store roll outs over a short period of time (40+ stores over FY13 and FY14 versus previous role out of c. 20 stores over the same period)
  •  41 stores opened over FY13. 43 stores confirmed for FY14 (34 over the first half and 9 over the second half)
  • Development of satellite distribution centre in WA with estimated commencement in June 2014
  • Risk: execution risk around new store openings particularly in light of macro retail environment; logistics and product supply management given aggressive increase in stores
  • Catalysts of change: industry consolidation; sourcing initiatives to improve speed and costs
  • Expect occupancy costs to decrease over FY14 given that there are more than 50 lease renewals due (management has flagged the potential for some store closures over FY14)
  • Target of 400 stores (not including larger stores – the smaller store footprint will be revisited in 2015
  • 17 stores opened over the first half of 2013 largely covered opening costs while the 24 opened over the second half of FY13 did not cover opening or indirect costs
  • Costs of doing business increased, wage inflation ate into margins, new staff were hired for new store roll outs, electricity costs increased significantly
  • Management estimates that c. half of the (84) new stores in both FY13 and FY14 were previous Retail Adventure sites (Sam’s warehouse (99 stores), Chickenfeed bargain stores (39 stores), Go-Lo/ Crazy Clark’s (275 stores))

Macquarie Equities Research
Date: 21 Aug 2013
Position: Neutral
12 Month Target: $17.90
Notes:

  • FY13 and FY14 is all about new store rollout and market share changes. Commentary suggests that there is still scope for more stores in FY2014
  • By the end of FY14 TRS will have increased its store base by c.50% in just over 3 years. If successful this will place in a strong position in FY15+ allowing TRS to leverage off operational efficiencies and drive future growth
  • The accelerated store opening program provides TRS with by far the strongest growth profile of the specialty retailers over the next two or three years. TRS is a strong medium term outlook proposition.
  • It will be well into FY15 and probably FY16 before store operating efficiencies can be achieved and key metrics brought back towards targeted levels.
  • Opportunity to refine the store portfolio and exit less desirable stores
  • Risk as cost base increases and supply chain, IT and management expand
  • Financial risk has been reduced following the recent equity capital raising
  • Modest increase in debt is expected over FY14
  • FX hedge in place to minimise the effect of lower AUDUSD
  • MRE assume 49 store openings over FY14

Credit Suisse
Date: 21 Aug 2013
Position: Underperform
12 Month Target: $13.70
Notes:

  • FY13 result produced lower than expected sales revenue and a fall in gross margin in 2h13
  • Possibility that large number of changes in the store network disrupted merchandising plans
  • CS seem to be strictly following their valuation outputs rather than examining the market dynamics around a potential TRS re-rating

Montgomery Fund
Date: 26 Aug 2013
Notes:

  • In the coming years this is a business with bright prospects
  • Looking at the Australia Discount Retail and then Retail Adventures administration, this has created a short term opportunity to expand at a low cost. Further there is an opportunity to capture market share and grow the business by around 30% in 2 years
  • 67m of incremental capital have been invested in what has historically been a high return business on incremental capital (40m on capex fixtures and fittings IT and DC infrastructure; 20m inventory; 7m on additional management to manage growth / expansion
  • Expect short term pressure on profitability as they absorb expansion costs and train staff. Longer term the business momentum is impressive. If management are able to manage the expansion plans as proposed Montgomery Fund expects very strong ROE from 2015+

Additionally Notes

  • Competitors – Kmart, Homeart, Big W, Target Australia    
  • 20 January 2009, Directors placed Australian Discount retail into voluntary administration – biggest retail collapse for 5 years in over 5 years.
  • 23 March 2009 Australian Discount Retail was sold to Retail Adventures (owned by Australian millionaire Jan Cameron)
  • 27 October 2012 Retail Adventures was placed into administration  - Jan Cameron will continue to run the viable portion/s of the business under a licence from the administrators with the intention of buying back the business after a restructuring – only brands expected to survive are Crazy Clarke’s and Sam’s Warehouse

Retail Spending Still Weak

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Decmil - The Early Mover in Mining Services?

Decmil Group (DCG)                                                              
Rationale:
DCG provides design, civil engineering and construction works for the resource, infrastructure and accommodation sectors. Currently its business comprises three operating divisions:

  • Decmil Australia  - specialises in design, civil engineering and construction to Australia’s oil and gas, resources and infrastructure sectors;
  • Eastcoast Development Engineering – specialist engineering business acquired in 2013; and
  • Homeground Villages – village providing accommodation services to workers in QLD’s resources hub.
Performance for FY2013 was better than expected, however management has been actively positioning the business in anticipation of a potential decrease in projects exposed to the resources and oil and gas sectors. Despite this, revenue over the 2013 financial year was geared mostly towards resource sector projects (59.5% of revenue), then oil and gas (32.5%), accommodation (7.0%) and finally Infrastructure (0.9%).

In considering a medium term investment in DCG, the real risk surrounds a downturn in the coal, iron ore and LNG oil and gas markets in which DCG operates. Such a downturn would directly impact on all aspects of the DCG business. An opportunity to invest in DCG however arises following management’s foresight to diversify future revenue streams toward alternate segments of the market (for eg Commonwealth Government Department of Immigration Manus Island facility). Thus a case can be established that DCG should outperform mining service pure plays and a hedge against this risk could be positioned accordingly.

Applying a long/ short strategic approach to DCG,  i.e. investing a short position in a basket of peer mining service securities should protect a DCG trade against the key risks surrounding this investment, namely decrease in the mining and resources sector, while allowing DCG to benefit from the upsides which differentiate it from its competitors.

Key Metrics:



Recent Developments & Results
12 Month Security Price and Volume



Recent Developments
27 Aug 2013: DCG Announces 8cps dividend (higher than consensus expectation), payable 27 Sep 2013 and record date of 6 Sep 2013. This will result in FY dividend of 12cps, 2cps higher than FY12

1 Jul 2013: DCG awarded a $137m contract from the Commonwealth Government for the construction of a major facility on Manus Island in PNG

18 Apr 2013: DCG completes acquisition of Eastcoast Development Engineering – cost of $19.3m upfront with further $10m in Arp 2014 if target returns achieved

10 Apr 2013: DCG wins $71m worth of contracts (2 contracts) to design and construct port and rail facilities to service the Roy Hill Iron Ore project. Work is to commence in 2014

6 Mar 2013: DCG wins a $25m contract to construct a support facility in NT for Shell Development Australia, responsible for the design and construction of the facility

11 Dec 2012: DCG wins $30m contract with Rio to cover a range of infrastructure works

30 June 2013 Results
Please refer to attached Results Presentation from 22 August 2013 for further detail.



Source: DCG 2013 Full Year Results Presentation, 22 August 2013

Analyst Positions:

Valuation
Note: Further analysis will require development of a DCF model



Peers / Competitor Analysis (RBC Report 22 Aug 2013)



Analyst Downside Analysis (RBC Report 22 Aug 2013)